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OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary affirmance in 
conjunction with her opposition to Price Waterhouse's emergency 
motion for stay of the District Court's May 25, 1990 Title VII 
judgment in this case. In that motion, plaintiff argued that 
the merits of this appeal are so "clear" that this Court should 
affirm the judgment of the District Court without the benefit 
of briefing, oral argument and deliberation. But plaintiff's 
arguments against full judicial scrutiny of the difficult legal 
and factual issues presented by this case do not begin to meet 
the Court's standard for summary affirmance. 
The District Court imposed liability on Price 
Waterhouse despite overwhelming evidence that plaintiff's 
partnership candidacy was deferred because she was abusive to 
subordinates, not because of her sex. The District Court's 
remedy is unprecedented in Title VII jurisprudence: to compel 
Price Waterhouse to make plaintiff a partner in the Price 
Waterhouse firm. The partnership was ordered in the face of an 
express finding that plaintiff's own "unreasonable intentional 
conduct • removed any possibility" that she would be made 
partner. The District Court determined that it was bound by 
the law of the case to a vacated opinion by this Court that 
was, in turn, based on an erroneous reading of the District 
Court's earlier findings. These and other aspects of this case 
raise difficult, substantial, and manifestly important 
questions of first impression. Moreover, this Court's grant of 
Price Waterhouse's request for a stay of the judgment and its 
order that the appeal be expedited effectively render moot any 
theoretical or practical justifications for invocation of the 
extraordinary and rare summary disposition procedure.1/ 
Plaintiff's request for summary affirmance must therefore be 
denied. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
This is an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C § 2000e, tl seq. Plaintiff Ann B. 
Hopkins contends that defendant's 1983 decision deferring for 
1/ ~ June 29, 1990 Order. Appellant's Brief and Appendix 
are due July 18, 1990; appellee's brief is due August 8, 1990; 
appellant's reply is due August 15, 1990; and oral argument is 
scheduled for September 7, 1990. Id. 
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.. 
one year her candidacy for admission to the Price Waterhouse 
partnership was based upon considerations of sex. She has 
sought an order requiring her admission to the partnership, 
back pay and attorney's fees. 
In its initial decision in 1985, after a nonjury 
trial, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1114 
(D.D.C. 1985), the District Court found that plaintiff's 
•conduct provided ample justification for the complaints that 
formed the basis [for defendant's] decision.• There were 
legitimate, nonpretextual bases for deferring her partnership 
candidacy. Plaintiff was •assertive, overly critical of 
others, impatient with her staff,• idi. at 1114, •overly 
aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult to work with• and generally 
abusive to subordinates. J.d. at 1113. These views were shared 
by Price Waterhouse partners and staff, and plaintiff admitted 
their validity. I,d. The District Court found that Price 
Waterhouse "had every reason and legal right to come down hard 
on abrasive conduct in men or women seeking partnership.• Id. 
at 1120. 
Nevertheless, the court found that Price Waterhouse 
had permitted an unquantified level of •unconscious• sexual 
stereotyping to play an "undefined role• in its decisionmaking 
process . .Id. at 1118. The District Court concluded that 
because Price Waterhouse had not proven by •clear and 
convincing evidence that the decision [to defer plaintiff's 
candidacy for one year] would have been the same absent 
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discrimination," id. at 1120, Price Waterhouse had violated 
Title VII.Z/ 
In August 1987, this Court affirmed the District 
Court's decision as to liability "[b]ecause Price Waterhouse 
could not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence" that it 
would have made the same decision deferring plaintiff's 
partnership candidacy irrespective of her gender. Hopkins v. 
Price Waterhouse. 825 F.2d 458, 472 (D.C. Cir. 1987).~/ 
On May 1, 1989, the Supreme Court of the United States 
reversed the decision of this Court. Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 109 s. Ct. 1775 (1989). The Court held that "an 
employer shall not be liable if it can prove [by a 
preponderance of the evidence] that, even if it had not taken 
gender into account, it would have come to the same decision 
regarding a particular person." .Id. at 1786. The Supreme 
Court reversed the judgment of liability against Price 
11 When plaintiff came up for partnership consideration the 
following year, she was not reproposed. The District Court 
ruled that Price Waterhouse's decision not to repropose 
plaintiff for partner the subsequent year was 
nondiscriminatory. Id. at 1115. That finding was not 
appealed. As will be discussed in more detail, infra. the 
District Court reaffirmed on remand that the decision not to 
repropose plaintiff for partnership was not discriminatory and, 
indeed, found that it was caused by plaintiff's own 
unreasonable conduct. 
~/ Judge Williams dissented from the panel's holding affirming 
liability, observing that "the record here provided no causal 
connection between Hopkins' fate and [sexual] 
stereotyping ...• " 825 F.2d at 474 (Williams, J., 
dissenting). 
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Waterhouse and remanded the case for further proceedings 
because this Court and the District Court had "erred by 
deciding that the defendant must make this proof by clear and 
convincing evidence •••• " l.d. at 1795. In an August 1, 
1989 order, this Court vacated its 1987 mandate and remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings. 
Upon remand and after additional briefing and 
argument, the District Court ruled that Price Waterhouse "ha[d] 
not met its burden" under the preponderance of the evidence 
standard and therefore was liable under Title VII. Finding of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand ("Findings on Remand"), 
at 11 (May 14, 1990). In determining the appropriate remedy, 
the court below concluded that it ' had statutory authority under 
Title VII to order Price Waterhouse to admit plaintiff to the 
professional partnership and that such an order was an 
appropriate exercise of its discretion in this case. l.d. at 
16, 19. The District Court also ruled that, although plaintiff 
had failed to mitigate damages, she was entitled to back pay 
for the period July 1, 1984 through June 30, 1990. 
The District Court entered its final order and 
judgment on May 25, 1990 requiring Price Waterhouse, inter 
~' to admit plaintiff into the partnership on July 1, 1990 
and to pay plaintiff back pay in the amount of $371,175 and 
reasonable attorney's fees. May 25, 1990 Remedial Order. On 
June 21, 1990, Price Waterhouse timely filed its Notice of 
Appeal and Motion for Stay in the District Court. The District 
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Court denied Price Waterhouse's request for a stay on June 25, 
1990, "except as to attorney fees." 
On June 29, 1990, this Court granted Price 
Waterhouse's request for a stay of the partnership order and 
back pay award and expedited the appeal. 
A. 
ARGUMENT 
Facts and Findings Below and the Standards Applicable 
to Motions for Summary Affirmance, 
"Price Waterhouse is a partnership that specializes in 
providing auditing, tax and management consulting services 
primarily to private corporations and government 
agencies •. Its partners are certified public accountants 
and other specialists." 618 F. Supp. at 1111. Notwithstanding 
its size, "Price Waterhouse has consistently sought to maintain 
the traditional characteristics of a professional partnership 
both in its management and partnership selection practices." 
Price Waterhouse's decision in 1983 to "hold" or defer 
plaintiff's partnership candidacy was a response by firm 
partners to plaintiff's serious deficiencies in interpersonal 
relationships, particularly in dealing with subordinates. The 
District Court found that interpersonal skills and respect and 
decency toward staff and subordinates were "properly an 
important part of Price Waterhouse's written partnership 
evaluation criteria." Id. at 1114. The inability to get along 
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with staff or peers was •a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
for refusing to admit a candidate to partnership.• Id. 
Plaintiff received more •no• votes on her candidacy 
than 85 of the 88 candidates in 1983. Id. at 1116. Nearly 
two-thirds of the partners that commented on plaintiff on the 
basis of direct experience with her had criticisms of her 
manner, style and relationships with subordinates. ~ Def. 
Ex. 27. Price Waterhouse candidates, male and female, are 
•regularly held because of concerns about their interpersonal 
skills .. • 618 F. Supp. at 1116. The partnership •takes 
any evaluations recommending denial of partnership or a 
negative reaction on this basis very seriously .•• The 
firm"s practice of giving 'no' votes great weight treated male 
and female candidates in the same way.• .Ig. 
The "hold" decision was not a final rejection. It 
gave plaintiff a legitimate and fair opportunity to become a 
Price Waterhouse partner: 
There is little reason to believe the hold 
was a cynical gesture; 16 of the 19 
candidates placed on hold with Ms. Hopkins 
in 1983 made partner in 1984, and in her 
case the decision to hold her over appears 
to have been a considered business 
decision that her talent justified giving 
her candidacy another look. It is clear 
from the record that she was given a 
genuine chance to demonstrate her ability 
to overcome her differences in interper-
sonal relationships. 
Findings on Remand, at 24-25. 
- 7 -
But plaintiff sabatoged her own "genuine chance" for a 
Price Waterhouse partnership. The District Court twice found 
that defendant's decision not to repropose plaintiff for 
partner the following year was not discriminatory. 618 F. 
Supp. at 1115. In fact, the District Court found that 
plaintiff's "unreasonable intentional conduct" (Findings on 
Remand, at 23), which consisted of misleading statements and 
misrepresentations, "removed any possibility that she would be 
accepted as a partner" after the initial "hold" decision • .Id. 
at 25. 
The District Court found that certain comments about 
plaintiff that antedated the "hold" decision may have been 
•tainted by unarticulated, unconscious assumptions related to 
sex.• 618 F. Supp. at 1118. Thus, although "it is impossible 
to label any particular negative reaction as being motivated by 
intentional sex stereotyping,• id., the District Court held 
that those impermissible ingredients "combined to produce 
discrimination" in this case • .Id. at 1120. 
On remand, the District Court was asked to re-evaluate 
the evidence under the lower preponderance of the evidence 
standard. The court found unpersuasive defendant's arguments 
that the nature, depth, diversity and intensity of the 
criticism leveled at plaintiff by partners and her peers and 
acknowledged by herself, and the evidence accepted by the court 
in the first trial that males with similar personality problems 
had also been "held" established by a preponderance of the 
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evidence that Price Waterhouse would have deferred the 
partnership of plaintiff, or any candidate with a similar 
record, regardless. of sex. Thus, the court not only required 
Price Waterhouse to prove that it would have rejected plaintiff 
regardless of her sex, but allowed the speculation of 
plaintiff's expert to disqualify as potentially tainted every 
criticism of plaintiff's •conduct• in the first trial that the 
court had earlier found provided •ample justification• for the 
decision. In short, even though plaintiff was unable even to 
identify a single comment as tainted, her expert's view that 
some of the comments might have been tainted was allowed by the 
court below to obliterate every legitimate criticism of 
plaintiff's behavior. ~ Findings on Remand, at 6-11. 
The District Court ordered Price Waterhouse to make 
plaintiff a partner in the firm effective July 1, 1990. During 
the trial, the court below acknowledged that ordering a 
partnership in a professional firm was an unprecedented Title 
VII remedy: 
I now am confronted with whether or not I'm 
going to exercise my discretion as a judge 
to be the first federal judge ever to put 
somebody into a partnership and I want to 
tell you that that's a difficult decision. 
1990 Tr. at 250 (emphasis added). Indeed, no federal court has 
ever decreed a professional partnership as a Title VII remedy. 
The circumstances of this case make it manifestly 
ill-suited for summary disposition. The extraordinary summary 
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procedure is generally invoked only in cases in which no issue 
of disputed fact exists,!/ where an •uncomplicated legal 
issue [is] to be decided in an area where the case law is well 
developed,•21 or the appeal involves a nonfinal judgment in 
an ongoing proceeding.~/ The •exacting standards•21 
governing summary disposition of appeals in this Circuit are 
well settled. "Because of the serious consequences that flow 
from granting summary disposition, the court imposes on a party 
who requests summary affirmance • a 'heavy burden.•• 
United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per 
curiam) (quoting United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288 
(D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam)). The movant must demonstrate 
that the merits •are so clear• that "plenary briefing, oral 
argument, and the traditional collegiality of the decisional 
process would not affect [the Court's] decision• and are 
therefore unnecessary. Sills v. Bureau of Prisons, 761 F.2d 
~/ See. e_._g_._, United States v. Glover, 731 F.2d 41, 45 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley. 
819 F.2d 294 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (summarily affirming 
order granting summary judgment); Walker v. Washington, 627 
F.2d 541 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (summarily affirming 
order granting summary judgment). 
2/ Glover, 731 F.2d at 45; see,~, Dornan v. United States 
Secretary of Defense, 851 F.2d 450, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam) (summarily affirming and applying •clear[] law of this 
circuit"). 
~/ See. e_._g_._, Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(per curiam) (review of preliminary injunction). 
2/ Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. 
Cir. 1986). 
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792, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Glover, 731 F.2d at 44; Parker v. 
Lewis. 670 F.2d 249, 250 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) 
(correctness of district court's decision must be "totally free 
from doubt" to permit summary affirmance). In addition, a 
party seeking summary affirmance must convince the Court that 
"the need for speedy resolution of [the] appeal," Glover, 731 
F.2d at 45, and the unique and special "circumstances of the 
case," Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 
justify preempting the ordinary appellate process. None of 
these factors exist in this case. 
B. This Case Presents Difficult, Serious and Novel 
Questions for Appeal. 
As Price Waterhouse demonstrated in its Emergency 
Motion for Stay, at 10-16, and its Reply, at 3-6, the District 
Court's judgment raises substantial and important issues 
relating to the interpretation and application of Title VII. 
1. The District Court's Liability Finding is Clearly 
Erroneous. The District Court's liability finding on remand 
creates factual and legal issues that are complex and unique. 
Although the court below on remand purported to apply the "less 
exacting" preponderance of the evidence standard of proof, it 
characterized Price Waterhouse's burden as "a difficult task of 
proof." Findings on Remand, at 11. Notwithstanding that the 
District Court had earlier found that "it is impossible to 
label any particular negative reaction [to plaintiff's 
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interpersonal skills] as being motivated by intentional sex 
stereotyping,• 618 F. Supp. at 1118, the District Court 
concluded on remand that Price Waterhouse was required "to 
separate out those comments tainted by sexism from those free 
of sexism,• Findings on Remand, at 10, and was required somehow 
to "identify each stereotyped negative comment.• .Id. at 9. 
The District Court allowed speculation to trump hard evidence 
and then faulted Price Waterhouse for failing to disprove that 
which plaintiff had found it impossible to prove. The Supreme 
Court's mandate cannot possibly be construed to have imposed 
such a "difficult" and "impossible" task upon Price Waterhouse 
on remand. 
Moreover, although the record contains substantial 
evidence that Price Waterhouse often "held" male candidates who 
manifested interpersonal skills problems similar to 
plaintiff's, the District Court did not mention, and does not 
even appear to have considered, that proof in its analysis on 
remand, even though this is seemingly precisely the kind of 
"objective evidence" that the Supreme Court contemplated should 
be considered in determining whether the firm had met its 
burden on the "same decision" issue. See 109 S. Ct. at 1791; 
compare NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 
396-97, 404 {1983) {when the "transgressions .•• that 
purportedly would have prompted [the] discharge were 
commonplace, and no transgressor had ever before received any 
kind of discipline," employer failed to meet burden of showing 
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discharge would have occurred absent antiunion animus). In 
short, the District Court's interpretation of the Supreme 
Court's mandate and its application of the preponderance of the 
evidence standard in the sex stereotyping context present 
perplexing questions in a new area of Title VII jurisprudence. 
These questions warrant careful consideration by this Court.a/ 
2. Partnership As a Title VII Remedy. The question 
whether federal courts have authority under Title VII to compel 
individuals to form a partnership is an issue of first 
impression. The District Court itself acknowledged that 
•whether the Court should force Price Waterhouse to make Ms. 
Hopkins a partner presents a difficult and unresolved issue.• 
Findings on Remand, at 16. 
The District Court purported to rely upon the Supreme 
Court's decision in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 
(1984), for authority to order partnership in this case. 
However, the "narrow holding• (]Ji. at 78 n.10) in Hishon that 
•in appropriate circumstances partnership consideration may 
qualify as a term, condition, or privilege of a person's 
employment" (emphasis added) for purposes of Title VII does not 
a/ This Court has not hesitated to overturn district court 
rulings in Title VII cases where, as here, the district court 
has seriously misinterpreted the record. Compare Palmer v. 
Baker, 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 1458, 1461 (D.C. Cir. 
May 11, 1990) (reversing district court's ruling that defendant 
had not violated Title VII because the •district court's 
conclusion .•. was based on a clearly erroneous 
interpretation• of the evidence). 
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resolve the question of the power of courts under Title VII to 
decide who shall be partners in a professional 
relationship.~/ In a concurring opinion in Hishon, Justice 
Powell observed that undue •impediments to the exercise of 
one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of 
association guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments,"l..Q./ i.d. at 80 n.4, and emphasized •that the 
Court's opinion should not be read as extending Title VII to 
the management of a law firm by its partners. The reasoning of 
the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship 
among partners be characterized as an 'employment• relationship 
to which Title VII would apply." Id. at 79 (emphasis added). 
The District Court's order would not only compel the creation 
of a "relationship among partners,• but would also apparently 
~/ The plaintiff in Hishon did not seek admission as a 
partner. Therefore, the issue whether that remedy is 
statutorily or constitutionally authorized was not before the 
Court. See 467 U.S. at 72 (plaintiff "sought •.• 
compensatory damages 'in lieu of reinstatement and promotion to 
partnership.' This, of course, negates any claim for specific 
performance of the contract alleged."); i_d. at 72-73 n.2; id. 
at 80 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring) . 
.l.Q./ The Court in Hishon rejected the argument that the First 
Amendment protected the right to engage in "'invidious private 
discrimination.•• 467 U.S. at 78 (citation). However, Price 
Waterhouse has made no such First Amendment claim. It contends 
only that in light of the collegial, private nature of the 
Price Waterhouse partnership, the First Amendment requires that 
the least instrusive remedial alternative available be chosen. 
Compare Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 303 & 
n. 11 (1986) ("the fact that [associational rights] are 
protected by the First Amendment requires that the procedure be 
carefully tailored to minimize the infringement"). 
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afford to the District Court permanent and continuing 
jurisdiction over that relationship.ill ~ May 25, 1990 
Remedial Order, at 2. 
Title VII expressly applies only to "employment• 
arrangements and makes "reinstatement or hiring of employees" 
an available remedy. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5(g) (emphasis added). 
There is nothing to suggest that Title VII was intended to 
empower courts to transform simple employment relationships 
into partnerships, or to order individuals to become partners 
once their employment relationship has been terminatea. 121 
11/ The courts have uniformly declined to extend federal 
anti-discrimination statutes, including Title VII, to members 
of professional partnerships. See,~, Burke v. Friedman, 
556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977); see also Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 
825 F.2d 257, 263 (10th Cir.), .Q.e.I..t. denied, 484 U.S. 986 
(1987). 
ll/ The courts in equity historically have been reluctant to 
compel the existence and continuation of personal 
relationships. ~, ~, Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 
335 (1897) (courts "will seldom, if ever, specifically 
compel ... performance of [a partnership] contract, the 
contract of partnership being of an essentially personal 
character•) (emphasis added); Marek v. McHardy. 234 La. 841, 
101 So. 2d 689, 693 (1958) ("Manifestly, in a case like this 
involving personal services coupled with a promise of the 
obligees to make the plaintiff their business partner, the 
court would not order the exceptional relief of specific 
performance."); compare EEOC v. Kallir Phillips Ross. Inc., 420 
F. Supp. 919, 926-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (denying reinstatement to 
executive position because it "required a close working 
relationship between plaintiff and top executives of defendant" 
and "frequent personal contact with defendant's clients"), 
aff'd without opinion, 559 F.2d 1203 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 
434 U.S. 920 (1977); Hyland v. Kenner Products Co., 13 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Case (BNA) 1309, 1321 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (rejecting 
reinstatement of executive because "a person in an executive or 
management position must have complete confidence of others in 
management"). 
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~ Wheeler v. Main Hurdman, 825 F.2d 257, 275-76 (10th Cir.), 
.c..e..I.t.. denied. 484 U.S. 986 (1987). ("The requirement that 
[Title VII and similar federal statutes] cover only employment 
situations suggests that Congress perceived a need to limit the 
application of these statutes."). The District Court"s 
decision wholly fails to "giv[e] effect to the meaning and 
placement of the words chosen by Congress," Hughey v. United 
States, No. 89-5691, slip op., at 6 (U.S. May 21, 1990), and 
presents serious questions of statutory interpretation. 
Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, Motion for Summ. 
Aff., at 14-15, the 1987 decision of this Court did not 
"indicat[e] • that it viewed an offer of partnership as the 
appropriate prospective relief" in this case. Plaintiff's 
assertion in that regard is most misleading. The issue of 
partnership admission was not tried, briefed, or argued in the 
District Court in 1985 and therefore was not a question 
presented for review in this Court or in the Supreme 
Court.ll/ Thus, this Court has not had the opportunity to 
deliberate and consider the merits of the indisputably 
important question whether Title VII's equal employment 
ll/ This Court correctly assumed in its 1987 opinion that the 
District Court in the 1985 trial did not evaluate whether 
partnership admission was an authorized or appropriate Title 
VII remedy due to its holding that plaintiff voluntarily 
resigned from the firm and was not "constructively 
discharged." ~ 825 F.2d at 472-73. This Court reversed on 
the constructive discharge issue and remanded the case to the 
District Court for determination of the partnership admission 
question in the first instance. 1_d. at 473. 
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provisions empower courts to create nonemployrnent relationships 
such as partnerships, and, indeed, that question has not been 
resolved by any other federal court.li/ It is an important 
question of federal law that should be fully briefed and argued. 
3. Partnership As a Remedy in This Case. Price 
Waterhouse also contends that the District Court committed 
reversible error when it ordered Price Waterhouse to admit 
plaintiff as a partner under the peculiar facts of this case. 
The court issued a partnership decree based upon the 
"ill-defined theory of 'sex stereotyping,'" Findings on Remand 
at 32, despite evidence from most of the partners who evaluated 
plaintiff that she did not pass a legitimate Price Waterhouse 
criterion for partnership, that she was given a fair and 
unbiased opportunity to correct her problems, that her own 
"unreasonable intentional" conduct deprived her of any 
"possibility" of making partner and that this process and these 
14/ Other cases relied upon by plaintiff, Pl. Motion for Summ. 
Aff., at 11-14, are simply inapposite. Lander v. Lujan, 888 
F.2d 153 (D.C. Cir. 1989), involved the reinstatement of a 
federal civil service employee to "essentially the same job" as 
he had previously held (id. at 158), a remedy that falls 
squarely within the jurisdictional strictures of Title VII. 
Brown v. Trustees of Boston University1 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 58 U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 19, 1990), affirmed 
an order compelling promotion of an "assistant professor" to 
"associate professor• with tenure. Such an order creates no 
more than a long-term employment relationship. In University 
of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 s. Ct. 577 (1990), the Supreme 
Court simply suggested in dicta that partnerships are not 
entitled to a special First Amendment privilege to withhold 
partnership candidate review materials during discovery, a 
proposition that is not at issue in this case. 
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events, which were the actual cause of her not making partner, 
were not discriminatory. ~ at 23-25. Ordering a partnership 
under such circumstances cannot reasonably be characterized as 
an appropriate exercise of equitable discretion under Title 
VII, even if the statute authorizes such relief. 
4. The District Court Erroneously Applied the Law of 
the Case Doctrine. The District Court ordered partnership 
based on the assumption that it was bound by the law of the 
case doctrine to a conclusion expressed in the previous Court 
of Appeals' decision with respect to whether plaintiff had been 
constructively discharged • .Id. at 14. But that remedial 
decision was predicated upon a liability determination that was 
overturned by the Supreme Court. It was contained in an 
o~inion by a panel of this Court that was vacated when this 
case was remanded to the District Court. And it was squarely 
and unavoidably tied to the panel's erroneous reading of the 
District Court's factual findings. The District Court has now 
made it clear beyond any room for argument that the damage 
caused by the conduct found to be discriminatory consisted of 
deferral of plaintiff's partnership candidacy for one year, 
treatment likewise received by eighteen other candidates. The 
subsequent decision not to repropose plaintiff for partner, 
which made it impossible for her to become a partner and which 
was the basis of her decision to leave the firm, was the direct 
and inescapable consequence of unreasonable and intentional 
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acts by plaintiff and was not tainted in any way by 
discrimination. This Court, in its previous decision, surely 
did not intend to find a constructive discharge under these 
circumstances. But, in any event, the opinion that addressed 
that subject has been vacated, is not the law of the case, and 
cannot have compelled the District Court to adopt a conclusion 
with which it did not agree. 
c. The Expedited Briefing Schedule Makes Summary 
Disposition Wholly Unnecessary. 
This Court's June 29, 1990 order establishing an 
expedited briefing schedule conclusively resolves any claim 
that summary disposition is necessary to effect "a speedy 
resolution" of the appeal,~ Glover, 731 F.2d at 45, and 
effectively moots plaintiff's request for summary treatment of 
the merits. Indeed, Price Waterhouse's opening brief is due 
less than two weeks after the filing of this Opposition and a 
complete appellate record will be available to the Court in 
approximately 90 days. See supra note 1. Under such 
circumstances, invocation of summary procedures would be 
duplicative and unnecessary. 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's assertion that the foregoing issues are 
"so clear" as to justify summary disposition is inexplicable 
and completely unfounded. Indeed, this Court's grant of a stay 
of the judgment demonstrates that the appeal presents 
substantial and important questions and that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that Price Waterhouse will succeed on the 
merits . .l.5./ It would therefore be inappropriate and unjust to 
resolve this case without engaging in the "collegial 
deliberative process" on appeal and in the absence of complete 
briefing of the merits and oral argument pursuant to the 
expedited briefing schedule. ~ Glover, 731 F.2d at 52 
(Mikva, J., dissenting). The motion for summary affirmance 
must be denied. 




Ulric R. Sullivan 
Assistant General 
PRICE WATERHOUSE 
1251 Avenue of the 







(D.C. Bar No. 367456) 
Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 420440) 
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 
1050 Connecticut Ave., N. w. 
Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 955-8500 
15/ To justify a stay Price Waterhouse was required to 
demonstrate, inter alia, a "probability of success on the 
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SM June 29, 1990 Order. 
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